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The Elements of Crime. A Psycho-Social Interpretation. By Boris Brasol.
With Introductions by John H. Wigmore and William A. White. New
York, Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1927. pp. xvii, 433.
Mr. Brasol was extraordinarily well prepared by study and practical
experience for the execution of a general work on criminology. He has
had a notable career as a brilliant young public prosecutor in Russia be-
fore and during the World War, has studied criminology under some of the
greatest European masters, has read widely in European and less thorough-
ly in American criminological literature, and recently, as a resident of the
United States, he has come into active contact with criminal conditions
and criminological doctrines in our own country. He is quite evidently a
man of great learning and a logical mind, and is remarkably free, for a
practising lawyer, from formal legalism and archaic metaphysics. The
book falls midway between the old dogmatic and schematic works of the
classical school of criminologists and the highly individualized and empiri-
cal investigations of the criminal personality by Dr. William Healy and
others who have accepted his approach to the study of criminal behavior.
There is little doubt that such detailed studies of individual delinquents as
those by Healy and the like should ultimately be exploited in the service
of constructing generalized deductions from these clinical inquiries, but
it may be doubted as to whether the time has yet come to do this, and
certainly Dr. Brasol has not mastered such evidence to a sufficient degree
to enable him to carry out such a task of synthesis. We must, then, regard
him as a modernized classicist rather than as a synthetic modernist in the
field of criminology.
The book is divided into two parts. The first is entitled "Crime as a
Social Phenomenon." This considers such questions as the scientific con-
ception of crime and the criminal, the nature of the criminal personality,
and the relation to criminal causation of: economic factors, religious and
family conditions, education and the press, and legislation and criminal
procedure. The second part of the book is entitled "The Psycho-physical
Nature of Crime." This deals with the question of the relative influence
of heredity and environment in the causation of crime, with the contrast
between legal and medical conceptions of criminal responsibility, and with
the leading forms of mental diseases, having special reference to the rela-
tion between the specific behavior patterns of each of these diseases and
potential criminality.
Mr. Brasol insists upon a broad sociological approach to crime and re-
jects the older single-track dogmas explaining criminality, whether anthro-
pological, socialistic or judicial. He definitely repudiates the older thesl4
that there is such a thing as a born criminal. He contends that one may be
born with certain psycho-physical traits which will render him more than
usually susceptible to external influences making for criminality, but he
denies that one can inherit traits which inevitably lead to criminal be-
havior. With this position most sane criminologists will be likely to agree.
He is also inclined to reject the older cut-and-dried classification of crim-
inal types, though he admits the existence of the professional criminal and
agrees that sub-classes within this group often approach a discernible uni-
fortuity of type due to similar methods, interest and conduct.
In dealing with the problem of the causation of criminal behavior Mr.
Brasol emphasizes the necessity of allowing for a great complexity of
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factors, including hereditary predisposition to degeneracy and a vast
number of influences in the social environment which condition the indi-
vidual in the direction of criminality. He endeavors to formulate the cal-
culus of criminal causation (pp. 103-4), and while we may not concede the
necessity or validity of any such schematic, mechanical or mathematical
formulation of the problem, nevertheless, one cannot but agree with the
conception of the complexity of the issue which the equation is designed
to imply. Mr. Brasol sharply criticizes the theory of the economic deter-
mination of crime as set forth by Bonger and other socialistic writers.
While the reviewer agrees with this scepticism, nevertheless it is difficult
not to feel that in this section the author has departed to some degree
from his usual scientific detachment on account of his hatred of the Bol-
sheviks. As author of Socialism vcrszs Citriization, it could scarcely be
expected that he would deal calmly with the socialistic hypothesis of
criminality. Yet he is not to be regarded as an unqualified or unthinking
euologist of the theory of business enterprise or of the pecuniary standards
and obsessions of our age. He holds that the great majority of criminals
of all types are drawn from the unproductive classes. In his summary of
the social causes of crime he sets forth the following indictment of the
exaggerated pecuniary evaluations and interests of the contemporary
period:
"When we begin to conceive that all moral foundations have been grad-
ually destroyed, men, women and children alike, clamoring for nothing but
material gain and self-gratification; when we think that people today, like
the Roman mobs in the days of the decay of their Empire, are striving
for nothing but 'panem et circenses'; when our families are found in a
state of complete dissociation, fathers and mothers having lost all Ethical
conceptions, and children morally neglected and abandoned by their par-
ents; when we see supposedly civilized nations madly engaged in nothing
but money-making enabling them to make mad expenditures for hideously
v-ulgar and intrinsically immoral purposes; when all this is realized,--then,
indeed, we begin to be drawing nearer to the scientific interpretation of
the problem of crime."
31r. Brasol deplores "the utter neglect of religious, ethical and aes-
thetical elements in modern education, both in the family and in the
school." He especially condemns the emphasis upon the pecuniary incen-
tive and motivation which is inculcated in our schools. These things not
only produce an "almost intolerable vulgarity of the public taste," but also
destroy those moral controls so essential in our society which is becoming
ever more complex and baffling to the individual. He feels that while "an
individual crime seldom can be traced to the influence of any single news
item," nevertheless contemporary journalism "unquestionably occupies a
prominent place among the factors which either cause or encourage the
growth of the criminal propensity." The sceptical reader will be more
likely to concede the above contention than he will Mr. Brasol's optimistic
observation that the press is "steadily growing more serious, also, perhaps,
less biased." One may, in spite of the author's continental derivation, de-
tect a strain of Comstockery in his observations on the growing freedom
in reference to sex in the drama, literature and art. In one place he says:
"The literary behavior of the pleiad of sexual writers, indeed, is collective
exhibitiondm constituting an offense against public morality, and inciting
the mentally underdeveloped to participate in the orgiastic feast." He
further contends that although it is very rare that one can detect any direct
connection between an "immoral" book and any particular crime, "still, the
criminogenetic character of sexual literature and art is beyond doubt." As
dght be expected from his professional antecedents, Mr. Brasol's analysis
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of the relation of defective and unwise legislation and of our unscientific
legal procedure to criminality is one of the best sections in the book, and
he presents an excellent outline of a proposed institute of scientific crim-
inology (pp. 220-23).
In discussing the relative importance of heredity and environment in the
production of crime, Mr. Brasol is distinctly an environmentalist, even
though he frankly admits the frequently hereditary nature of predisposi-
tion to mental and moral weakness which makes one succumb to criminal
temptation much more easily than the normal types. He must certainly
be regarded as a moderate social determinist. The following paragraphs
well summarize his general views upon the social determination of crime
and upon the complexity of these contributing social factors:-
"Generally speaking, the criminologist, in the course of his analysis, must
dissect and scrutinize every socio-economic factor in the same way as a
histologist in his laboratory, examines under a microscope the delicate make
of vegetable tissues determining their chemical composition. The deeper
we dig into the layers of the social order, tracing the mutual correlation,-
the more it is likely that some day-perhaps in the remote future--science
shall reach the very root of the criminal propensity. Above all, the stu-
dent has to be guarded against the tendency to interpret the complicated
phenomenon of crime by any single cause, no matter whether social or
psychological.
"Neither logic nor philosophy can justify such an attempt. Only simpli-
fied science-but is it science after all?-can hope to make progress by
mechanically reducing the number of ingredients entering into the struc-
ture of society. The elimination of some constituent elements of a phe-
nomenon never serves to explain its nature; it narrows the scope of human
knowledge, and ultimately destroys the pioneering faculty of the mind
which prompts us to extend scientific inquiry to the vast fields of things
knowable, but still unexplored . ..
"Here, then, criminology touches upon the real-not the imaginary-caus-
es of criminality in its present-day militant aspect. It is not the mode of
production, nor poverty, in se, nor prosperity, nor the shape of the nose, nor
the brachycephalic symptom, nor any other incidental factor, that generates
the phenomenon of crime, but those fundamental destructive changes which
take place in the composition of society itself, assuming the form of dan-
gerous gangrenous processes and threatening the very existence of social
order."
Mr. Brasol's chapter on the nature of criminal responsibility is excel-
lent, particularly his discussion of the difficulties in the way of using expert
psychiatric testimony under the conditions imposed by the present legal
duel in the courtroom. He suggests the following commendable innovations.
a. Prohibiting the contending parties to hire their own expert alienists,
who should be appointed by a neutral body standing above and outside
of the inevitable conflict between prosecution and defense.
b. Requiring the psychiatrist to present an all-embracing study of the
mental constitution of the defendant, in the light of the latest discoveries
in the fields of psycho-neurology, bio-chemistry, biology and psychology.
c. Taking, as it were, judicial notice of the expert's opinion on the men-
tal state of the defendant, making it a constituent part of the juror's ver-
dict.
The author's classification and summary description of mental defect
and of mental disorders in their relation to criminality are reasonably
satisfactory and up-to-date. He accords a discriminating acceptance to the
Freudian psychopathology. The reviewer does not know of a better brief
sketch of this field in a work on criminology.
In conclusion, it may be said that the book is a valuable contribution to
the literature of the field. It should be useful either to the serious general
reader or to the student. Though scarcely designed as a college textbook,
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it could be used for this purpose. No effort is made to deal in any sense
-with the field of penology and those modes of repressing crime outside of
prison walls. It is pre~minently an introduction to the nature and causes
of crime and to the nature of procedure in ascertaining guilt. Apprehen-
sion and repression are scarcely touched upon.
HARRY ELIMR BAnNWES.
The History of Contempt of Court. The Form of Trial and the Mlode of
Punishment. By Sir John C. Fox. New York, Oxford University, Ameri-
can Branch, 1927. pp. xx-iv, 252.
It is an odd thing to reflect that the power of both English and American
courts to punish summarily for constructive contempt rests in the main
upon an undelivered opinion of the Court of King's Bench. The prepared
but unuttered opinion of Mr. Justice Wilmot in this case of Rex V. Almon
has, however, had a vitality that greater and better considered judgments
might well envy. Though written in 1765, it was unknown to the profession
until the papers of the great Chief Justice were published by his son in
1802. With an eloquence that in itself carries conviction, Wilmot there
stated that "the power which the courts in Westminster Hall have of vin-
dicating their own authority is coeval with their first foundation and insti-
tution," and "stands upon the same immemorial usage as supports the
whole fabric of the common law!' 1 Judges of a later era saw little reason
to question the magisterial accuracy of such an utterance. That the Chief
Justice, as perhaps other and later Chief Justices,2 could have misread and
thus made history seemed hardly credible. In England Rex v. Almon
by frequent citation gained the force of binding precedent; in America it
was to the light shed therein by Wilmot upon the ancient institutions of
the common law that judges turned to discover the inalienable prerogatives
of courts of justice. Upon the rock of Wilmot's judgment many an Ameri-
can statute designed to curb what the people considered a much abused
power was shattered. The power "inheres" in courts from their very in-
stitution; it cannot constitutionally be abridged.
In 1883, however, during the debate in the House of Lords upon the
Contempt of Courts Bill, Lords Fitzgerald and Bramwell termed the power
to punish summarily for constructive contempt as an institution "contrary
to the genius of English law." The challenge thus voiced was not ignored.
In 1885 Mr. Solly-Flood took sharp issue with Wilmot's historical accuracy
in a study made of the origins of summary commitment for contempt.3 But
the full case against Wilmot and incidentally the case in behalf of the
patriot Wilkes was presented in a series of brilliant and painstaking eazays
in the Law Quarterly Review from 1908 to 1924 by Sir John Fox. It is
this material in elaborated form that the late Senior Blaster of the Supreme
Court Chancery Division has embodied in this volume.
It is a romantic thing to trace the origins of an institution into the dim
past and to free our present conceptions from such errors as those in which
others, less wise, have tempted us to indulge. It is also a long and burden-
some task. Twenty years bespeak the effort that Sir John Fox has put
into this volume and its quality reveals a genius for infinite patience. Sir
John goes deeply into the origins of contempt, attachment and trial by
examination. He shows us how in Britton's day attachment was but a
2 Wilmot's Notes, 243, 254.
2 See Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power undcr the Consti-
tution (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 353.
3 SollyFlood, The Story of Prince Henry of Monmouth and Chief Justice
Gascoign (1885) 3 TRANs. ROYAL HIsT. Soc. (N. S.) 47, 147.
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mesne process to bring the body of the defendant into court for trial in
the customary way; that for libels the course of proceeding at common
law under Coke was by indictment; that the attempt of Chief Justice
Scroggs to cause a rule to be served upon the author of an alleged libel
was one of the articles in his subsequent impeachment; and that the ear-
liest instance of the summary punishment of a libel on the court by a
stranger occurred in 1721 when the courts were tempted to follow the
practice of summary jurisdiction set by the House of Commons in the
Stuart period.4 It is thus upon the insecure basis of a few scattered de-
cisions from 1721 to 1765 that Wilmot's claim of "immemorial usage"
must rest. Instead the exercise of summary powers over punishments for
libel on the Court had more mundane origins and Wilmot baldly, though
perhaps unconsciously, clothed a desire for summary power with the man-
tle of antiquity. It is only since the eighteenth century that the press
assumed any pretensions tot power. It was during this century that the
pamphleteer became a political figure and made more acute the contest for
freedom of utterance. The assertion of summary jurisdiction comes thus
at a time when both court and Commons realized that the printed page
made libel a powerful instrument. Moreover, it is shortly after the defeat
administered to courts in 1792 by Fox's Libel Act, that Rex v. Almon gains
its ascendancy. Rex v. Clement in 1821,5 that firmly wrote Rcx v. Almon
into the texture of English law, prevented a defendant, as Sir John puts
it, by its "rule of summary procedure from claiming a right [to the trial
of the libel by a jury] which Almon could not have established, in any
case." Truly the liberties of the Englishman had narrowed since the days
of Scroggs!
In a concluding chapter Sir John reviews the history of Almon's Case
in the United States. It was the acquittal of Judge Peck on the impeach-
ment charges brought against him in the United States Senate in 1831
that had the effect of upholding the doctrine that a libel upon the Court
could be dealt with summarily, whereas in Toledo Newspaper Company V.
United States,G the Supreme Court, through a misleading argument by
counsel for the government, wrote off the statute books the curb that
Buchanan had tried to impose upon courts in their exercise of summary
powers. Since then the Supreme Court has been more lenient to statutory
enactments restricting contempt powers T and more anxious to see that
arbitrariness in their exercise should be checked.8 State courts have not
hesitated to adopt Almon's Case wholeheartedly and on occasion hold un-
constitutional the exercise of powers that the common law never deemed
"inherent" in the courts nor necessary to their existence. It is, indeed, only
by assuming to themselves the power to make history as well as law that
judges can continue their exercise of prerogatives, whose "inherent" char-
acter rests only upon the pronouncements of their later and less learned
brethren. Sir John Fox has made the use of the term "inherent" as ap-
plied to the power to summary punishment for constructive contempt an
empty and ignorant phrase.
J. M. LANDIS.
'Rex v. Clement, 4 B. & Aid. 218 (1721).
5 Ibid.
I247 U. S. 402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560 (1918).
7 Michaelson v. United States, 266 U. S. 42, 45 Sup. Ct. 18 (1924).
8 Cooke v. United States, 267 U. S. 517, 45 Sup. Ct. 390 (1925).
BOOK REVIEWS
A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas. By Walter L. Summers. Kansas
City, Vernon Law Book Co., 1927. pp. xviii, 863.
It is impossible to portray the difficulties Professor Summers had in his
way, to indicate in any detail how well he met them, or to criticise intel-
ligibly any of his more important conclusions in a brief review of his
book. Doubtless, there is no other highly specialized subject of the law
which has presented so many hard problems, and to handle which requires
so comprehensive a grasp of the larger subjects, as does the law relating
to oil and gas. Here are found all the hard knots of contracts, property and
equity, to say nothing of constitutional law and damages, and many of them
are not infrequently found in the same case.
The story is practically the same in every jurisdiction. The lawyers and
judges of a district or state awoke to find themselves in an oil field.
Those who did not surrender their profession and become "oil men" were
immediately submerged in problems and litigation having as their subject
matter every sort of instrument, agreement, and act, which highly excited
farmers, barbers, jitney drivers, dentists, real estate men, and all the other
quickly convertible members of a community, could draw, make and do.
Few lawyers had ever heard of the very difficult problems presented. For
the first ten to twenty years, cases were decided principally on false ana-
logies, fireside equities and euphonious and ambiguous phrases. Every
lawyer and every court had its own theory on every important question.
Large amounts were involved; able lawyers were massed usually on both
sides of every case. There was no end of effort and expense. The courts
were hard pressed. Until very recently, therefore, there was an abundance
of variety and flux and a minimum of crystallization. In brief, oil and gas
law has been equally feverish, fluctuating, and hazardous as the oil business
iix other respects. The present day oil and gas lease, for instance, tells
the story of a thousand hard fought cases, and in some states, its evolution
is still in process.
Professor Summers undertook to write the law of this volatile subject
for fifteen or more jarring courts of final jurisdiction, to say nothing of
courts of intermediate appellate jurisdiction. He found chaos. It would
be too much to say he has reduced it to order, that is, to an order which
will be accepted. He has, however, met the larger problems squarely and
has for the first time subjected them to a thorough-going analysis. He has
refused to be led astray by the bulging terminology of the courts. He has
rather analyzed in terms of functions; he has inquired what the respective
parties can and cannot do under varying situations. Instead of talking in
terms of ownership, title, property, mutuality and the like, he has talked in
terms of relations, interests, rights, privileges, powers, immunities, liabili-
ties, duties, etc. He has looked at what the parties were permitted or re-
quired to do by the courts. Needless to say, his capacity to employ the
analysis of Hobfeld stands him in good stead, and the remarkable thing is
that he has discovered the courts are reaching unbelievably similar results,
though employing startling differences in terminology. For instance, an
estate of the dignity of a defeasible fee in Texas, in so far as the interests
and protection given thereto, is in the end about the same as a license in
Pennsylvania, or a profit a pnrendre in some other state. The lessee in
Louisiana under a no-ownership theory can do about as much and have as
much protection as he can in Texas under an absolute ownership theory.
In other words, the author indicates that our most serious difficulties here,
as elsewhere, are with terminology, analysis and classification.
The analysis of Professor Summers is always illuminating. The best
part of his book is found in chapters two to eight. Here, he is dealing with
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the landowner's rights, duties, etc., as well as the interests created by oil
and gas leases. Chapters nine to fifteen deal with the development and the
interpretation of the lease. In these he had the pioneer work of Judge
Veasey 1 which must have been reassuring. The remainder of the book
deals with numerous problems of lesser size but not necessarily of less
difficulty; most of these he leaves largely to a citation of the authorities. If
the cases cited on many points are not determinative and satisfactory the
author cannot be held responsible. He merely uses the material at hand.
His lists of citations and notes are full, and frequently contain striking
excerpts from the opinions. So far as I have been able to check, all the
outstanding cases are cited appropriately and repeatedly. Incidentally, the
author confirms the judgment of Professor Kulp as to the most noteworthy
cases, in that many of those chosen by the latter for his case-book on the
subject are analyzed and discussed in this text.
A survey and analysis of the cases pertaining to the oil business were
badly needed; something beyond a mere catch-word classification and digest
of the cases. The courts needed it and so did the profession at large. I
would not say that Professor Summers finished the job; that cannot be.
There are too many problems which yet remain to be fully developed before
the law can be crystallized. There are two other less ambitious books
which cover small parts of the subject well, but Professor Summers is the
first writer who has done a dependable piece of work throughout. His
book ought to aid greatly in stabilizing the law on the more important
questions of this subject in all jurisdictions.
The book is beautifully done-the binding, paper, printing, format, ac-
curacy of citations, make it an attractive piece of craftsmanship.
LEoN GReeN.
The Business of the Supreme Court. A Study in the Federal Judicial Sys-
tem. By Felix Frankfurter and James M. Lan.dis. New York, The Mac-
millan Co., 1927. pp. viii, 349.
This book is, as it was intended to be, of interest to the student of history
and government, rather than of value to the lawyer in his practice. There
are surprises in store for the reader who, from the title expects a detailed
or technical discussion of the business that comes before the Supreme
Court. More space is devoted to the inferior courts than to the Supreme
Court, and there is no elaborate discussion or technical analysis of the busi-
ness that comes before any of the courts.
This book is, in fact, a history of the legislation which has resulted in
our present system of Federal courts. One might wonder why such a book
should be called "The Business of the Supreme Court." But the
reader soon finds that the authors have given, step by step, the story of
the long struggle through which the courts established by the Judiciary Act
of 1789 have finally come to be the Federal courts of today. And the
thought running through the book is that changes in the original judicial
establishment have come only when compelled by the increasing pressure of
the business of the Supreme Court upon the Justices of that court.
The authors show that the seeds of controversy are found in the fact
that the Act of 1789 established three tiers of courts, but only two grades
of judges. There were District Courts, with only original jurisdiction,
Circuit Courts, with original and limited appellate jurisdiction, and a
Supreme Court with appellate and a limited original jurisdiction. But
there were only District Judges and Justices of the Supreme Court. The
1 (1920) 18 MICH. L. Rav. 445, 652, 749; (1920) 19 MICH. L. R.V. 161.
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Circuit Courts were to be held by the District Judges and the Justices.
Almost immediately the struggle began for a system under which the Just-
ices should be relieved of all duties except as members of the Supreme
Court and the Circuit Courts should have judges of their own. There vere
those who believed that the nisi prius work of the Justices would better
qualify them for their appellate duties. Others took the opposite view. It
was inevitable that, as the country grew and litigation increased, the latter
should finally prevail. But, when the need for relief was recognized, many
preferred to increase the number of Justices, rather than relieve them of
nisi prius duties. And the tenacity with which Congress clung to circuit
riding Justices is shown by the many steps taken before the idea was finally
abandoned.
As the burden of litigation increased, Congress would yield little by little.
This the book brings out vividly. Originally there were three Circuit
Courts each to be held twice a year by two Justices and one District Judge.
In 1793 the necessity for relief of the Justices was recognized to the extent
of providing that only one Justice need attend each Circuit Court.
They then tell how, but for the injection of partisan politics, the struggle
to free the Justices of circuit riding duties would have ended in 1801. Just
at the close of the Adams administration sixteen Circuit Judges were
authorized and appointed to hold the Circuit Courts and the Justices were
relieved of all nisi prim duties. The authors think this was an act well
suited to the then conditions. But being regarded by the Jefferson admini-
stration as a partisan measure, it was repealed in 1802. However, some
relief was imperative. And this, of necessity, had to be something dif-
ferent from that provided by the repealed act. Hence, the same Congress
divided the country into six circuits with a Circuit Court in each to be held
twice a year by one Justice and one District Judge. That impossible duties
were being imposed on the Justice was recognized by providing that the
court might be held by one judge.
And, of course, the struggle began anew. As the country grew, addi-
tional circuits were created and, for each additional circuit, a Justice was
added to the Supreme Court. This was the extent of the relief given until
1869 when nine circuit judgeships were created. Congress was still un-
willing to give up the circuit riding Justice, but provided that each Justice
should be required to attend only one session of a circuit court in two
years. The Justices continued to be charged with some nisi prius duties
until the establishment of nine Circuit Courts of Appeals in 1890. This
later led to the abolition of Circuit Courts. Finally the recent act, the
authors think, for the first time, gave us a real judicial system. They
make much of the importance of that feature of the act which provides
for an annual conference of the senior judges of the Circuit Courts of
Appeals presided over by the Chief Justice.
In addition to showing that all the changes thus outlined have been
forced by the pressure of business on the Supreme Court, it is shown that
the same cause has resulted in restrictions upon the jurisdiction of that
court until the class of cases that can be taken to it as of right have been
reduced to a minimum. The book gives an accurate statement of the
various statutes, together with an instructive discussion of the conflicting
views as each step was taken. It will be of value as a book of reference.
It expresses the opinion that the work of establishing a perfect judicial
system is, by no means, finished. And the authors have furnished much
food for thought to those who are to carry on the work.
Wirimu L. FnwmsoN.
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The Story of the Law. By John Maxcy Zane. New York, Ives Washburn,
Inc., 1927. pp. xiii, 486.
One should be thankful to a man who makes a serious effort to present
the story of law in five hundred pages. One should admire his courage,
grant him his prejudices, and turn to seeing what he has made of them.
One should not cavil at vast numbers of mistakes of fact: he works in a
field too wide for any man to master the details, nor are most of his details
vital to his problem. All these concessions the reviewer would gladly make,
and more, if in return he could have a Story of Law, But a story, as the
reviewer understands it, is a narrative with a beginning, a middle, and an
end-above all, with significant outlines and proportions which remain in
the memory whether details stick or not. And the difficulty with Mr.
Zane's book is that it is not a story. H. G. Wells set a high level of meas-
urement. Mr. Zane is no H. G. Wells. Yet one troublesome thing about
the book is that one feels he might have come much nearer than he has;
as, indeed, his other writings witness.
It all begins fascinatingly enough, with life among the ants, who, it
seens, are the perfect socialists, or communists. Man, achieving some-
thing beyond mere instinctive intelligence, can never attain such perfection
of law, but moves into higher realms of existence. One gathers that enough
law and enough obedience to law is very good, and too much is very bad.
One hopes to see the workings toward and around the golden mean in man.
But this trail peters into sand.
We take a fresh start with primordial man, who by virtue of his social
instinct suits his conduct to his fellows-which fact lies at the basis of all
law. Shame and lynch law are the enforcing agencies. Tribes appear in
the glacial age, developing tools, and a fighting instinct; tribal property
in hunting grounds grows from instinctive fighting to preserve the food
supply. The fighting leads to capture of females; to slavery (1); and to
the necessity of restraining rules within the tribe. "But the story passes"
to herders, and then to soil cultivation. Language, and the idea of "right"
as that which accords with custom, are introduced. Also justice, which
"requires a rule to be applied to all alike." In which connection Kant and
Hegel greatly overrated their own thinking. (Throughout the book, there
is no suggestion of the age-old and continuing process of classifying men
and actions; or that "customs" are not all alike, but alike at best for men
in like circumstance.) Hence eye-for-eye appears as a device to place the
injured party or his kindred "back upon an equality with the injurer."
Marriage "in the nature of things must have resulted" from the knowl-
edge of the father's part in procreation. Trial marriages, which certain
childishly minded persons now advocate, were tried in the savage state.
The primitive kinship is wholly through the mother. In the matriarchal
family the mother rules. The couvade is a means of acknowledging pater-
nity and belongs to the savage state of doubtful paternity. The patriarchal
family, tribal property and religion come in for mention. We stop to dis-
miss socialistic communism. The thinking, reasoning individual has
emerged and we are about to trace his rise. Freedom of choice exists,
despite some scientists; the great mass are at least imperfectly capable of
choice.
The foregoing summary is bald and unfair. But it is excusable. It brings
out the discontinuity of argument in the book; the amazing rashness in
interpretation of material; the tendency to view institutions as good or
bad per se, rather than as well or badly adjusted to the conditions of their
existence; and the brusque introduction of the big stick on every third page
to club some unwary ancient or modern soul: Hegel, Aristotle, Holmes,
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Gray, the historians, the socialists, the Supreme Court, Kohler and Stamm-
ler, Coke, Bentham: these go down like ninepins. Cicero, Mansfield, Mar-
shall, and the legal profession in general, come in for praise. Also Sir
Walter Raleigh.
The chapters move through Aryan, Babylonian, Jewish, Greek, Roman,
Medieval, English law, and finally to the Constitution--"The Absolute
Reign of Law"--International Law, and a Conclusion. The slogan of the
whole is Roman Law, Commerce and the Constitution. Roman Law ap-
pears as responsible for most of the good in private law ever since. Com-
merce is the universal civilization and character builder. That the age
of commerce has passed into that of industry, and that of industry has
begun to pass into that of investment, is overlooked; in consonance with
which the treatment of the Constitution is necessarily skewed.
The whole is marred not only by unwarranted interpretation of old in-
stitutions and their origins, by occasional assertions of institutional bor-
rowing from people to people where evidence is lacking, but by contradic-
tory and muddy thinking. On page 236 William makes a conquest title to
all England good "by law"; on page 209, "It must be plain that when
rights can be decided by the event of a fight, law ceases to exist." And
so on. Authorities are nowhere given.
For all this, the book is worth reading, at least for lawyers. Laymen
may get lost in the technical terms here and there or in the ex presenti
criticism of a Greek advocate's analysis of his case. Nor have laymen
the background into which to fit the picture of Coke's prosecution of Ra-
leigh, nor even the Babylonian application of sale on approval to the female
slave. But for the lawyer interesting bits of information, most of which
are doubtless fairly accurate, abound in the pages. The discussion of the
beaver would be charming anywhere. The author has read astonishingly,
if not scientifically. He wields a pen vigorous and personal. The beach
is full of pretty pebbles to weight the pocket with. One can make his own
pattern out of them after he gets home. And why not?
K. N. LLEwELLYN.
Minimum Wage Legislation in Massachusetts. New York, National Indus-
trial Conference Board, Inc., 1927. pp. xiii, 243.
This is the latest of a series of studies of various phases of social legis-
lation in the United States published by the Conference Board. There
are special reasons why a detailed study of the minimum wage ex\perience
of Massachusetts is particularly timely. This state alone of the thirteen
which passed minimum wage laws adopted a system which provided no
penalty, except condemnation by public opinion, for non-compliance with
the wage rate decrees. When the District of Columbia law was invalidated
by the Supreme Court in 1923 it seemed probable that all state laws on
this subjeci which, like that of the District of Columbia, carried penalty
provisions, could be proved unconstitutional. Since that date, in fact, the
laws of two states (Arkansas and Arizona) have been declared invalid,
It appears, then, that those who desire an extension of this form of social
legislation must rely on the Massachusetts type. Hence the importance
of a careful study of the accomplishments of the law in that state.
This research report of the Conference Board examines in detail the
economic problems involved in legal regulation of wages Separate chap-
ters are devoted to the relation of the minimum wage law to the cost of
living; to the volume of employment; to the profitableness of business en-
terprise; and to the location of industry. Each of these special sections
of the report contains a collection of statistical data carefully analyzed
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to disclose the effect of legal wage regulation upon the problem under con-
sideration. This compilation of economic data will prove of use to many
students not interested primarily in the question of minimum wage laws;
and to the student of social legislation may well serve as a model for
further research in this field. The usefulness of the book is increased by
the inclusion of an introductory chapter describing in some detail the
mechanism for administering the law; and an appendix which includes the
important documents, a record of all wage decrees, and a collection of
statistics.
The results of the study show that the Massachusetts law has failed to
accomplish its purpose of equating the wages of women workers with the
cost of living; that only in special cases has it raised wage rates; and
that it has had small effect upon the general welfare of industrial workers.
On the other hand, the fears of those who opposed the law on the ground
that it would be detrimental to business enterprise in Massachusetts have
proved unfounded. These results are admittedly relative to the type of
law under examination and not conclusive regarding the social utility and
practicability of minimum wage laws in general.
E. S. FURNISS.
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